



From Snowflake to Snowstorm:

Cloud Breaches and Detections

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
B.A - Information systems and Cybersecurity
M.A - Criminology



Co-organizer of BSidesTLV
Defcon Goon
Volunteer in Trace Labs



Amateur Homebrewer



**Adversaries
aren't breaking in,
they log in.**



~~A fully managed, cloud native data platform that decouples storage and compute for elastic scalability, high concurrency, and near-zero administration.~~

**The chilliest warehouse in the cloud:
Instantly scales, devours data mountains, and spits back
results before you blink.**

The Snowflake Campaign - **TL;DR**

Threat Actor

UNC5537

Financially Motivated

Victims

165+ Organizations

 Santander

ticketmaster



Time Frame

Few Months

Vulnerability

None

Combination of Misconfigurations



The Snowflake Campaign - ATT&CK



Resources Development

Tool to automate some/all exploitation

Way to identify instances owned by victims

Staging place for stolen data

Identify configuration gaps

Exfiltration

Exfiltrate data outside of the organization

Initial Access


Obtain creds from infostealer

Identify snowflake instance (Native tool)

Login

Impact

Extortion



The Actual Issues

Challenges securing SaaS against
identity attacks

Credentials stolen via infostealer

Accounts lacking MFA



The Actual Issues

Built-in Snowflake features
to exfiltrate data

Inability to Enforcing MFA and
monitoring for unusual activities



Could Companies Detect This?

Does SaaS provide security logs?



Are you ingesting them?



Have you investigated them?



Phragmites australis (Cav.) Trin. ex Steud.


Could Companies Detect This?



Do you have detection for inner-
SaaS actions or just logins?


2022

Was data breached in the Cloud?



2023

Breaches that involved data stored in the Cloud



82% Share of breaches that involved data stored in cloud environments-public cloud, private cloud or across multiple environments

Case Study: Midnight Blizzard



Attacked

November 2023

Disclosed

January 2024



Threat actor is APT




TTPs used are basic and common



Target was Microsoft – owner and builder of Azure – one of the main Cloud Service Providers

Estimated Attack Flow



Cloud Detection Engineering is **HARD**




Context-Aware, Behavioral and Anomaly-based



Do we have a
baseline to compare
against actions?



When actions are
identical, we need to
detect intention.



Logic should be
generic to be applied
across the board.

Behavioral Detection Engineering



Threat Intelligence

Event Metadata


- Location, type (hosting, VPN, TOR)
- Time, Browser, OS
- Event-spike

Activity type

- Type of action
- Platform and/or region


Platform/Entity sensitivity

Misconfiguration and/or vulnerabilities



Something is Going on

- Is it Malicious?



What is Snowflake



	Databases	Snowflake
Logs	Audit logs written to local files or syslog	ACCESS_HISTORY & QUERY_HISTORY system views capture every auth, DML, DDL, etc.
Locations	On-prem and on SIEM	Data lives in S3/ADLS/GCS object storage Metadata & logs fully managed within Snowflake service
Integrations	Connect via ODBC/JDBC/CLI drivers Must install & manage SIEM agents or log shippers (e.g. Beats)	Native connectors to Splunk, Datadog, etc. - Snowpipe & event table streams for near-real-time SIEM ingest - Rich partner ecosystem (Fivetran, StreamSets)

Practical Examples

Snowflake log source



Database

SNOWFLAKE

Schema

ACCOUNT_USAGE

Logs

QUERY_HISTORY

LOGIN_HISTORY

SESSIONS

ACCESS_HISTORY*

Practical Examples

Snowflake log source



QUERY_HISTORY

Latency for the view may be up to 45 minutes

- Logs all queries
- Example columns:
 - query_text
 - database_name
 - user_name
 - role_name
 - rows_produced
 - And more

Practical Examples

Snowflake log source

LOGIN_HISTORY

Latency for the view may be up to 120 minutes (2 hours)

- Logs login attempts
- Example columns:
 - EVENT_TIMESTAMP
 - USER_NAME
 - CLIENT_IP
 - IS_SUCCESS
 - SECOND_AUTHENTICATOR_FACTOR
 - And more

Practical Examples

Snowflake log source



SESSIONS

Latency for the view may be up to 180 minutes (3 hours)

- Details of sessions
- Example columns:
 - USER_NAME
 - AUTHENTICATION_METHOD
 - CLIENT_APPLICATION_ID
 - And more

Practical Examples

Snowflake log source



ACCESS_HISTORY

Enterprise edition ONLY
Latency for the view may be up to 180 minutes (3 hours).

- All user activity
- Example columns:
 - user_name
 - direct_object_accessed
 - objects_modified
 - And more


Practical Examples

Snowflake log source




QUERY_HISTORY	LOGIN_HISTORY	SESSIONS	ACCESS_HISTORY
<u>Latency for the view may be up to 45 minutes</u> • Logs all queries • Example columns: • query_text • database_name • user_name • role_name • rows_produced • And more	<u>Latency for the view may be up to 120 minutes (2 hours)</u> • Logs login attempts • Example columns: • EVENT_TIMESTAMP • USER_NAME • CLIENT_IP • IS_SUCCESS • SECOND_AUTHENTICATOR_FACTOR • And more	<u>Latency for the view may be up to 180 minutes (3 hours)</u> • Details of sessions • Example columns: • USER_NAME • AUTHENTICATION_METHOD • CLIENT_APPLICATION_ID • And more	<u>Enterprise edition ONLY</u> <u>Latency for the view may be up to 180 minutes (3 hours).</u> • All user activity • Example columns: • user_name • direct_object_accessed • objects_modified • And more


Password Spray



Exfiltration



Masking Policy Modification



Snowflake is a **Symptom,** not the problem

It will happen again

- Adversaries are no longer breaking in, they log in.
- Behavior beats tools, everywhere, every time.

MFA

Mandatory

Shared Destiny

**“we've really pivoted
from a shared-security
model to more of a
shared-destiny model
with our customers”**

Snowflake's CISO, Brad Jones

Thank you

Questions?

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